We analyze geographic patterns of trade between individuals using transactions data from eBay and MercadoLibre, two large online auction sites. We find that distance continues to be an important deterrent to trade between geographically separated buyers and sell ers, though to a lesser extent than has been observed in studies of non-Internet commerce between business counterparties. We also 
costs, which can impede geographically distant buyers and sellers from finding each other; communication barriers, which hinder the efficiency of negotiations; and, more generally, contracting costs, which are driven by the inability to monitor and discipline the misconduct of distant transacting parties. For instance, James E. Rauch and Vitor Trindade (2002) find that ethnic Chinese networks have increased bilateral trade flows between country pairs, and that in Southeast Asia the effect is larger for differentiated products than for homogenous goods. Pierre-Philippe Combes, Miren Lafourcade, and Thierry Mayer (2005) report that firm and immigrant networks are important facilitators of intra-France trade. Anderson and Douglas Marcouiller (2002) show that country-level indices of institutional quality are associated with trade flows. In an application to the trade of financial assets, Richard Portes and Helene Rey (2005) find a negative cor relation between telephone traffic and bank presence and the distance effect on equity transactions. Finally, Hillberry and Hummels (2003, 2008) show that regional patterns of trade are determined by industry location and supply-chain optimization decisions.
Agglomeration of industries in search of spillovers or national advantages (Glenn Ellison and Edward L. Glaeser 1997) leads to a high volume of short distance hauls of inter mediate goods. Moreover, efficiency of hub-and-spoke distribution networks results in a high volume of intrastate shipments by wholesalers that are the recipients of intrastate trade. Pankaj Ghemawat (2001) argues that inattention to the nonphysical dimensions of distance is at the root of many firms' international strategy failure.
The rise of the Internet naturally leads to the question of whether the institutional environment of online commerce alters the geography of trade flows. This paper analyzes the geographic patterns of trade on two large online auction sites, eBay and MercadoLibre.
eBay is the largest online auction site in the world, and our data is a representative sample of all eBay transactions (except eBay Motors) conducted within the 48 continental US states. MercadoLibre is the largest online auction site in Latin America. We chose to study MercadoLibre mainly to check the robust ness of the results we obtained using eBay data, but also to understand whether additional geographic barriers to trade arise in the context of a less developed set of economies.
Our setting is especially interesting because it allows us to observe commerce in its purest expression, as a transaction of end products between individual economic agents. Trading on online auction sites is largely independent of the geographic con figuration of traditional distribution networks, the impact of which on the geography of trade flows is emphasized by Hillberry and Hummels (2003) . Moreover, focusing on the trade of end products should isolate the patterns observed from the physical proximity chosen to optimize the supply chain in business-to-business commerce Furthermore, the online auction environment provides an exceptional opportu nity to study the distance dependence of trade, as the environment can be considered close to "frictionless" in certain important dimensions.2 First, costs of computerized searches are practically nonexistent and independent from location, as are costs of communication using email and a fairly uniform format and language. As for ship ping costs, a flat shipping fee is quoted by most eBay sellers for transactions within the continental United States, largely equalizing this margin across different seller locations.3 Note, also, that, within the continental United States, tariffs are nonexis tent, and sales taxes, which are imposed by the states, should encourage out-of-state purchases as opposed to in-state purchases. Our main result is that distance still has a negative effect on trade on eBay and
MercadoLibre, though the effect is much smaller than has been observed in off-line trade. This effect is highly nonlinear, with trading volume abnormally high within the same city. Once beyond the driving distance of the city limits, the effect of distance on trade is relatively small. As expected, the nonlinearity of the distance effect is strongest for goods that have to be consumed in a specific location, such as opera tickets; however, it is evident in all categories of items. Further results suggest that "trust" may be a significant contributor to the distance effect. The "same-city" effect is much more pronounced in those categories where seller reputation is lower.
We also find some evidence that culture is a key factor in shaping the geography of trade. The same-city effect is strongest for local-interest items such as sports memorabilia.
Our paper advances the literature on intranational trade, helping to explain the factors behind an observed proximity bias that exists even after controlling for the most relevant causes previously identified (such as optimization of the supply chain, shipping costs, and search frictions). We show that even in the absence of search costs, information asymmetries, such as uncertainty regarding the reliability of a seller, may serve as an important barrier to trade,4 and that proximity may serve as a substitute for trust.
Our paper also contributes to the literature on the impact of the Internet on the globalization of the economy in which Caroline L. Freund and Diana Weinhold (2004) , for instance, find that Internet connectivity is associated with increases in trade volume. We also complement the work of Bernardo S. Blum and Avi Goldfarb (2006) , who find that local tastes appear to be an important driver of digital-goods consumption. Some of our findings in physical-goods trade reinforce their conclu sion regarding the importance of local tastes, though other findings point to factors, such as trust, as being another source of the observed home bias on the Internet. Our 2 The "home bias" literature in finance can also be characterized as studying an environment that is similarly "frictionless." For example, Joshua D. Coval and Tobias J. Moskowitz (2001) find that mutual funds are likely to hold regionally biased portfolios, and argue that monitoring costs may be an important factor. 3 One may also consider the inconvenience caused by the time it takes to ship objects a long distance as an unobserved shipping cost. However, while one would expect shipping time to vary linearly with distance, as described later in the paper, we find a highly nonlinear pattern of distance dependence that varies very little between 50 and 2,000 kilometers.
4 For example, Rauch and Trindade's (2002) ingenious study of how Chinese immigrant networks affect trade does not distinguish between a search cost story, in which trading partners cannot find each other, and an infor mational asymmetry story, in which trading partners do not trust each other. results, along with Blum and Goldfarb's findings, may be interpreted as suggesting a potential limit to the Internet's ability to eliminate geographic barriers. Factors such as lack of trust and local tastes may still render geography an important factor in determining market boundaries and trade flows.
I. Theoretical Framework
To motivate the analysis, we will use a simple auction model with an exogenously determined number of participants. The willingness of buyers to pay will depend on the characteristics of the good auctioned and the characteristics of the seller, includ ing the seller's geographic proximity to the buyer. Higher willingness to pay will lead to a higher probability of winning the auction. The effect of distance among agents on the willingness to pay will influence the probability of winning the auction, and therefore the number and aggregate value of transactions we should observe between agents from any pair of geographic locations. Let's assume that in a certain auction there are L locations, and that at each location /, there are Mx sellers, indexed by j = 1,..., Mb and N{ buyers, indexed by i = 1,..., Nh
The utility of buyer i in location b for a good sold by seller j in location s is given by uibjs ? 7 + ^b,s + ?ibjs> where 7 is some fundamental value of the item auctioned, and jib s is a factor that affects the utility of all buyers in location b for goods sold by sellers in location s, such as the distance and shipping costs between the two locations. fibtS may also be affected by the nature of the good being auctioned or the average reputation of the sellers, as the cost of a recourse action increases with distance. eibjs is an indepen dently and identically distributed random disturbance that is idiosyncratic to buyer i (in location b) and seller j (in location s).
If we assume that the auction mechanism is efficient (i.e., that it awards each good to the buyer with highest willingness to pay) and that eibjs is independently and identically distributed across buyers and locations, and follows a Type-I extreme value distribution, we can express the probability that a buyer from location b wins an auction in which the good is sold by seller j at location s as
(1) Pr {buyer from b wins auction of seller j at location s} =-^b ex^^ following multinomial logit choice probabilities (the Nb terms reflect the population weighting of buyers across locations). The more positive the effect of the distance fjLb s, the more likely the largest valuation will be drawn by a buyer of type b. By the same token, the larger the number of buyers of type b, Nb, the more likely the highest valuation will occur in a buyer of this type. Observe that if the geographic distance has no impact on a buyer's valuation, the probability of winning the auction depends exclusively on the number of buyers of each type, and the item will likely be sold to economies with a larger number of buyers.
If we take logs in equation (1), we obtain the following expression, which is linear in the effect of distance jib s and the log of the number of buyers in location b, Nb: where Tb s is the total number of sales to buyers in location b by sellers in location s;
Ms is the total number of sellers in location s\ and ks is a constant term capturing the effect of the fundamental value of the good, 7, and cs as defined above.
The gravity equation suggests the following testable hypotheses: (a) the total number of sales (we will repeat the analysis with the total dollar value of the sales)
to buyers in location b by sellers in location s, Tb s is proportional to the size of the economy of the buyers, \ogNb, and of the sellers, \ogMs\ (b) when all transactions are pooled in the analysis, the effect of distance on the intensity of trade, jib s, should be such that an increase in the distance between players should reduce the number of transactions; and (c) the impact of distance on the amount of trade will depend on the value of the item and the reputation of the seller.
In the following section, we describe the data used in the empirical analysis.
II. Data Sources
We developed this study with data from two leading online auction sites: eBay, and MercadoLibre. Online auction sites are well suited for our study not only because these firms are interested in minimizing the impact of distance to increase the size of their networks, but also because they are a good proxy for consumer-to-consumer The objective of the paper is to understand the impact of distance on Internet trade. Some goods transacted on eBay can only be consumed in a particular city (e.g., tickets for a cultural event), and other goods are affinity goods, such as memo rabilia from sports teams, which are sought mainly by people residing in certain locations. Including these goods in our sample could call into question whether our findings were driven by them or whether they reflected more general traits of Internet trading behaviors. Thus, with the exception of the section on the city-level effect, we focus our paper on those goods that we can characterize as nonlocal. To do this, we classified all subcategories of items (a total of some 23,000) into three groups: (a) not local, (b) somewhat local, and (c) definitely local, and included in our sample only those in the first group.11 Table 1 with the sampling procedure used with the eBay data. However, it comes at the cost of not being able to obtain all the listing characteristics that might affect demand. Table 2 presents some summary statistics from the MercadoLibre sample. There are several reasons why these data sources are especially valuable for econ omists who try to understand the geography of trade. First, they depict the purest possible form of commerce, end product transactions between individual economic agents whose geographic patterns are dominated neither by the concentration of industries in search of spillovers or natural advantages, nor by the endowment of big suppliers of unique, branded goods. Second, these marketplaces are pure inter mediaries that facilitate trade in a variety of goods by heterogeneous agents. Thus, short of running a comprehensive census, focusing on these sites is one of the best ways to examine geographic trading patterns for a relatively large cross-section of product and agent varieties, and helps us to understand which factors make trading more sensitive to distance. Third, one may argue that the main benefit of the Internet as a trade facilitator is to reduce search costs, and it is reasonable to think of these marketplaces as being essentially "frictionless" in this regard. Fourth, shipping and 11 For instance, single-disc DVD players were classified as not local, because they are of interest to potential buyers throughout the United States. On the other hand, college-related collectibles were classified as somewhat local, because even though colleges can recruit their students from all over the country, student bodies and alumni tend to be geographically concentrated. Finally, Idaho collectibles were classified as definitely local because of the high likelihood of co-location of buyers and sellers for items related to this state. 12 To test the robustness of these results, we also ran the analyses in the next two sections with all types of items (local, somewhat local, and not local) as well as with items for which the seller did not specify a shipping cost. The results were essentially the same. For the items without a specified shipping cost, we input the average shipping cost of an item in its category. http://www.mercadolibre.com.ar/argentina/ml/p_loadhtml? as_menu=MPRESS&as_html_code=SML_05). handling fees are often quoted explicitly by the seller on these Web sites, and, for a wide class of goods (the ones considered in this study) these fees apply uniformly to buyers of differing locations (at least within the same country). Thus, we can effec tively control for shipping cost differentials across locations (with the exception of variations in the time-of-arrival dimension).
These features render eBay and MercadoLibre close approximations of the "unified marketplace" view of the Internet, though with several caveats. First, the products that are bought and sold through these sites, although encompassing a large variety, are mainly new and used household durables, and thus extrapolations to other categories of goods is not possible. Second, a similar "representativeness" criticism may be lev eled against the demographic characteristics of the users of these Web sites, or the Internet in general, qualifying any extrapolations to the off-line world.
III. Results from Analyses Aggregated at the State/Province Level
In this section, we analyze whether physical distance between the buyer and seller reduces the intensity of Internet trade. If the online auction sites are able to eliminate (2000) and Hillberry and Hummels (2003) , who tested the impact of distance on interstate commerce in the United
States using data from the Commodity Flow Survey of the US Census. Both of these studies find a negative and significant effect of the distance variable. These studies also find a very significant "home-state bias" effect, as seen in the large coefficient estimate on a dummy for same-state transactions, which suggests there are costs to trading across state borders that are not purely distance dependent.14 In the regression with eBay data, we obtain results that have a sign consistent with prior studies. When we compare our results to the models of reference, we observe that the effect of distance in Internet trade is much smaller than in the cen sus data. The coefficients of distance in the eBay regressions are roughly one-tenth to one-twentieth the magnitude of the coefficients in Wolf (2000) and Hillberry and Hummels (2003) , implying that trade falls 10 percent each time the distance doubles.
However, the coefficient on same state is similar to what was found by Wolf (2000) and Hillberry and Hummels (2003) , implying that intrastate commerce is 1.8 to 3 times higher than the amount that would be justified by other factors. The combina tion of these two results seems to indicate that although eBay is fairly effective in mitigating the effect of distance on interstate commerce, a "home bias" persists.15 14 Specifically, Hillberry and Hummels (2003) show that the home-state bias found by Wolf (2000) diminishes once shipments from wholesalers are excluded from the CFS dataset (wholesalers tend to ship in-state more than manufacturers). However, the same-state coefficient continues to be economically and statistically significant. 15 We realize that the economic reality of the markets we analyze is very different from that used by Wolf (2000) and Hillberry and Hummels (2003) . Both of the latter studies use the Commodity Flow Survey of the US census, which covers a representative sample of shipments from US mining, manufacturing, and wholesale The analyses using the MercadoLibre data support these findings. Table 4 shows the results of these analyses. In the first model, distance is measured by the distance between country capitals. In the second model, distance is measured by the distance between provincial capitals. We observe a negative distance effect that is some what higher than that of the eBay sample. This effect is attenuated by a very strong same-country effect and a relatively strong same-province effect. It is interesting to note from this analysis that the same-country effect seems to be much stronger (six times stronger) than the same-province effect. This difference may be caused by customs barriers, but it may also be due to an amplification of the frictions mani fested in the "same-province" effect.
establishments. By contrast, we use items traded in eBay, which are usually consumer goods. Thus, not only are the goods different in nature but so are the parties who trade. In Wolf (2000) and in Hillberry and Hummels (2003) , the buyers and sellers are professionals acting on behalf of a corporation. In our paper, they are individu als acting in their own interests. As we focus on the transactions of end products between individuals, our study is especially relevant to understanding consumer preferences about trading with distant counterparts. Our results cannot be attributed to buyer and seller location choices based on the optimization of a supply chain. 2002) . Finally, the latter part of the paper, which focuses on city-pair dis tances, is not subject to this criticism. We analyzed the robustness of our results in several ways. First, we considered whether the distance and same-state coefficients were actually the result of a rela tive density of buyers and sellers in certain geographic locations. Essentially, this raised the question of whether we would observe the same coefficients if buyers and sellers in our sample were matched randomly. To test this possibility, we randomly matched the same number of buyers and sellers as we included in our sample and ran the regression in model II of Table 3 , repeating this procedure 1,000 times. We found the same-state coefficient to be statistically significant in 56 instances, the number we would expect to find by chance alone. In addition, the number of 16 We measure distance as the great-circle distance between state capitals. For intrastate distances, we use Wolf's (2000) formula, which utilizes the (population-weighted) distance between the two most populous cities within a state: Dii t = 2 x [1 -PiA/(PiA + Pia)} x Di l2, where Pi X and P( 2, denote the population of the largest and the second-largest city within the state, respectively, and Di n their distance from each other.
same-state transactions we found ranged from 10,800 to 11,400, compared to 20,770 in the actual sample. The average coefficient on distance was -0.00083, which was statistically significant on 32 occasions and negative in 551 of the regressions. All of these factors suggest that our results are not due to random pairing but to conscious choices on the part of buyers and sellers.
We also tested these results against the possibility that they were driven by the idiosyncratic characteristics of certain segments of our sample. Specifically, we included category fixed-effects in the regression models and ran the analyses using the data exclusively from one category in order to verify that the results were not driven by a certain type of item. We also classified the auctions in our sample as a function of the buyer's experience with eBay transactions and as a function of the seller's reputation and repeated our analyses with each of these segments. Table 5 presents the results of running model IV, that we use as a base for the analyses in the next section, for the different subsamples. The overarching conclusion is that the distance and the same-state effect are significantly present in all the segments of our sample.17
Finally, we inquired as to whether the absence of trade between certain pairs of states (in one direction or both) biased our estimations. First, we filled in the miss ing observations by defining the dependent variable as the logarithm of trade, in the number or value of transactions, plus one. Second, we ran our models using the
Poisson specification described in J. M. C. Santos Silva and Silvana Tenreyro (2006).
In both cases, our findings were essentially equivalent to the ones described here.
In summary, we find that the distance effect is present in both of our samples. It seems that the Internet reduces, but is unable to completely eliminate, the frictions that cause the impact of distance. The powerful constraint posed by state borders raises the questions of what causes this force and whether state lines are the critical distance point at which a discontinuity occurs. We will address these questions in the sections that follow.
IV. What Drives the Same-State Effect on eBay?
In this section, we analyze whether the distance effect observed in the prior sec tion is explained by the same frictions that affect non-Internet trade, such as ship ping costs, time zones, trust, or sales taxes. We will give special consideration to the possible reasons for the observed discontinuity at the state border.
The most evident trade friction is the cost of shipping, which is likely to increase with distance. Also, it is possible for transportation companies to have a two-tiered pricing structure for interstate and intrastate transport, a disparity which would gen erate the same-state effect. By focusing on transactions with flat shipping and han dling rates, we potentially eliminate this friction in our analysis. However, the cost of shipping may still impact the decision to trade with a distant seller if the buyer considers the cost of a potential return. If we assume that the rates quoted by the seller are proportional to the cost of shipping the item, the possibility of an in-person 17 We ran all the analyses in Table 3 and in Tables 6 and 7 for each of the subsamples used in Table 5 . The results were essentially the same. We use a stratified sample of eBay listings taken between February and May 2004 that involves US buyers and sellers. We include in the sample only those subcategories of items that could be clearly identified as nonlocal.
To control for category heterogeneity, we run our base specification by aggregating transactions between location pairs at the category level and using category fixed effects. We also run the specification using data exclusively from one category (once for video games and once for jewelry, respectively). To control for heterogeneous buyer experiences, we classify the auctions in our sample as a function of the number of feedback reports received by the buyer, regardless of their sign. We classify auctions as having new or sophisticated buyers as a function of where they fall in the distribution of feedback reports (below or above the median). To control for heterogeneous seller reputations, we classify the auctions in our sample as a function of the percentage of negative feedback reports received by the seller. We then classify auctions as having good or bad sellers as a function of where they fall in the distribution of negative feedback reports (below or above the median). We use model IV of item return will be more valuable the higher the cost quoted in the listing. In models II, III, and IV of Table 6 , we test this assumption by explicitly including the shipping cost in the regression.18 Shipping cost has the predicted negative, and statistically significant, impact on trade activity. The same-state coefficient remains unchanged, however, suggesting that shipping cost is not an explanation for the same-state effect. It does not seem to explain the distance effect either, as the coefficient of the distance variable remains negative, significant, and at about the same level.
Another possibility is that the idiosyncratic culture of the Internet is responsi ble for geographic patterns of trade. For instance, previous research19 has shown that online bidders commonly wait to place their bids until just before the auction expires, a strategy known as sniping. This strategy may be somewhat more difficult to implement for a specific auction if the buyer and seller are not in the same time zone (especially if the auction ends late at night or during the buyer's work hours).
To test this possibility, we include a dummy variable in the model indicating whether (2000) formula, which utilizes the (population-weighted) distance between the two most populous cities within a state. SAME-STATE is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if buyer and seller are located in the same state and zero otherwise. SHIPPING COST is the median transportation cost for shipments from state s to state b in percentage. SAME TIME ZONE is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the buyer and seller are in states with the same time zone and zero otherwise. Standard errors are in parentheses. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level.
the buyer and seller are in the same time zone. We find that the coefficient is not sta tistically significant and has virtually no impact on the other variables of the model (Table 6 , model III). These results lead us to discard time-zone difference as the cause of the physical distance effect.
The critique that overstatement of intrastate distances may artificially cause the "home-bias" effect20 could have greater basis in larger states (provided state size correlates with the measure of distance). This effect is potentially magnified by Wolf's (2000) finding that the share of shipments within a state to its total shipments 20 Assuming a linear effect of distance on trade, an imputed intrastate distance larger than actual distance will yield smaller predicted intrastate commerce. The difference between the actual commerce and the imputed volume will be picked up by the same-state dummy (Hillberry and Hummels 2003 and Wolf 2000). Table 6 , model IV individual dummies for the intrastate trade of five large states.
The coefficient on the same-state dummy remains positive, significant, and approxi mately at the same level as before, while the same-state coefficient of the large states is negative and significant, except for Montana. Moreover, in the case of California, the sum of the same-state and the same-state-California coefficients is basically zero, perhaps because the influence of Silicon Valley makes Californians more com fortable with Internet commerce, or perhaps because the rest of the country is espe cially interested in items coming from California, a state known for setting trends in many cultural (and fashion) dimensions.
One of the risks of trading with a distant party is the difficulty of exerting any recourse if the other party does not fulfill his or her obligation. In the same way that the letter of credit was designed to address this issue in international trade, eBay has developed several features that aim to increase user trust in the online commerce platform. These include the electronic payment system PayPal, buyer protection, and a feedback system. Several papers in the empirical industrial organization literature
show that bidders respond to certain levels of negative feedback with a reduced willingness to pay.21 If reputation is effective in mitigating the concerns of buyers for whom distance makes it difficult to exercise any recourse, we should observe that negative feedback generates a higher reduction in the willingness of distant buy ers to pay. In Table 7 , we interact distance and the same-state dummy with dummy variables that indicate whether the median seller's feedback rating for that state pair is below certain thresholds.22 The significant coefficients in the interactions suggest that trust contributes to the effect of distance and that the feedback system helps to mitigate, but does not completely eliminate, this effect. Furthermore, the impact of negative feedback is less visible within the same state (the positive coefficient on the interaction term suggests that sellers with bad reputations are more likely to find a buyer in the same state), which is consistent with an interpretation of the same-state effect that attributes the higher intensity of intrastate commerce to an increased pos sibility of direct enforcement of the trade agreement, either by returning the good in person or by compelling the seller to deliver on his or her promise.
Finally, taxes are often associated with geographic patterns of trade. Austan Goolsbee (2000) shows that Internet purchases are partially driven by sales-tax opti mization. In general, sales taxes are only collected if the buyer and seller are located in the same state.23 Thus, differences in the tax regime of the seller state should have no impact on trade except in the sense that when the seller and buyer are in the same state they will be less likely to engage in trade, and even less likely if they are 21 See Bajari and Hortacsu (2004) for a survey of these results.
The variable BAD-SELLER
indicates whether the median seller rating is between 98.2-99.3 percent, and the variable VERY-BAD SELLER indicates whether the median seller rating is below 98.2 percent. In our transac tion data, 75 percent of sellers have a rating better than 99.3 percent and 90 percent of sellers have a rating better than 98.2 percent.
23 The seller will not be responsible for collecting sales taxes if he or she has no physical presence, or nexus, in the state of the buyer. In these cases, the buyer is obligated to report and pay the use tax?which is basically equal to the sales tax?in his or her state of residence. However, given the administrative complexity and widespread ignorance of this obligation, a vast majority of interstate Internet buyers do not pay sales tax. Another possible motivation for buyers to prefer sellers in their own vicinity is the desire for immediate gratification?to enjoy the purchase as soon as the transaction is completed. If this impatience were driving the geographic patterns of trade, we would observe a significantly stronger distance effect on the buy-it-now transactions than on the regular auctions. We would expect that buyers who were more sensitive to the delay in receiving the good would be less likely to engage in auctions that required waiting until the closing of the bidding process, and would choose either the buy-it-now option or other channels of trade. To investigate the merit of this hypothesis, we re-estimated our basic gravity equation specification by interacting the same-state and (log) distance variables with the percent of the transactions vol ume that was achieved through buy-it-now sales between each state pair. We found that neither interaction variable affected the same-state or distance coefficients in an economically or statistically significant manner.24
In summary, although shipping cost seems to deter Internet commerce between distant buyers and sellers, it does not explain the effect of distance observed in online trading. Moreover, trust seems to be the only variable that has some reliable impact on the same-state effect. This finding is consistent with the possibility of direct recourse in case of breach of contract, which provides a strong incentive for agents to keep trading relationships within a limited radius. The question then arises as to whether state limits are the relevant distance for intense commerce or whether shorter radii, such as city limits or driving distance, are more important. We address this concern in the following section.
V. Results from Analyses Aggregated at the City Level
The existence of a strong positive "same-state" or "same-province" effect on the intensity of Internet commerce suggests the existence of a sort of "trading gravity 24
The buy-it-now results also indicate that our findings are not caused by "shill-bidding," a strategy employed by eBay sellers to raise their selling price by using a different screen name (alias) to bid on their own items. This was an unlikely explanation because shill-bidding could only be responsible for a proximity bias if (a) shilling sellers won an extraordinary number of auctions, which would come at great expense to them; (b) the alternative aliases sellers used for shilling were registered in the same state, a choice that might reveal their plot; and (c) in the case of the eBay data, sellers also used their shilling alias for selling, which would make it more difficult to build a reputation.
field" within which the intensity of transactional activity is much greater than with out. Whether state borders or other milestones determine the reach of the attraction field is an empirical question. In principle, we may hypothesize that the city limits, the county line, or a specific travel length are justifiable alternatives to the state border. To further explore this question, we exploit the fact that our eBay dataset contains the location of all buyers and sellers in the sample.25 For the analyses in this section, we also use subcategories of items classified as local or somewhat local as we aim to identify the characteristics that determine the locality of a good.
To identify the point of discontinuity in the distance effect more precisely, we test the gravity equation aggregating the data at the city level and decomposing the distance variable into a series of dummy variables that take the value of one if the distance between the buyer and seller is within a certain interval and zero otherwise. We graph the coefficients of the distance dummy variables in Figure 1 .
Remarkably, the coefficients for all the distance intervals have similar levels and decrease smoothly as the distance increases, whereas the same-city coefficient is more than six times the other coefficients. This result suggests that, contrary to what one would expect, "driving distance" is relevant for Internet commerce. In theory, the Internet would enable markets to extend their reach almost limitlessly, and even if that benefit is partially observed for all other levels of distance, the city limits seem to represent an important barrier to trade.
Hillberry and Hummels (2008) find a similar result for the flow of commodities in the United States. The cause behind their finding, the co-location of participants in the supply chain to exploit natural advantages and spillovers (Ellison and Glaeser 1997), does not seem plausible in our setting. In the previous section, we found that the same-state effect was at least partially caused by direct enforcement ability and mitigated by reputation mechanisms.
To explore the causes of the same-city effect, we rerun the regression on distance dummies for each of the 27 main item categories in eBay. Table 8 presents a ranked list of the coefficients of the same-city dummy for the different categories. An inspection of this list suggests several hypotheses. First, we observe at the top of the list tickets, which need to be used in a specific loca tion. Next to tickets, we find sports memorabilia, items that are likely to be owned and sought after by fans residing in the location of a particular team. For instance, a person in Sacramento is less likely to buy a Seattle Mariners baseball card than a person in Seattle. Thus, it seems that cultural factors, of which sports fandom is an example, have an important role in causing the same-city effect. However, we see that the items on which the city effect is smallest also seem to have a strong cul tural component, such as entertainment memorabilia, art, collectibles, books, dolls, and bears. These items are probably of interest to consumers nationwide, and their uniqueness makes buyers more likely to expand their search geographically in order to buy them.
We then regress the category-specific coefficients of the same-city dummies on the percentage of negative feedback in the average seller record and on the average price, average shipping cost, and average weight of an item in that category. Table 9 Unfortunately, the MercadoLibre dataset was provided to us aggregated at the province level. Log (distance in km) Notes: In this figure, we graph the results of a regression in which we ran specification (3) at the city-level. We used a flexible specification for distance by constructing indicator variables that take the value of one if the dis tance between the buyer and seller is within a certain interval. The figure plots the regression coefficients for these distance indicators. We set the log of distance to be zero if the buyer and seller are located in the same city. We use a stratified sample of eBay listings with US buyers and sellers taken between February and May 2004. Distance between cities is measured as the great-circle distance.
presents the results of the regression. Despite the potential attenuation bias caused by an estimated dependent variable, we observe a positive and significant effect of the reputation measure. The other variables do not significantly enter into this regression. One interpretation of these results is that as the likelihood of a breach of contract increases (the seller has a more negative reputation), it is more important to have the possibility of a direct enforcement mechanism, measured by proximity in the same-city effect. In contrast, the coefficients on shipping costs and weight are insignificant, suggesting that freight is not the main determinant of the same-city effect.
In summary, the results in this section support the hypothesis that despite the ease of searching that the Internet provides, the city limits or "driving distance" cause an "attraction field" that results in an excessive concentration of trade within these areas. In addition to goods that need to be locally consumed, cultural factors and the possibility of a direct enforcement action in case of breach of contract may deter mine the existence/need of a "local" market, even on the Internet. , we rank the coefficients of the SAME-CITY dummy variables in regressions of measures of intercity trade on distance and economy size by category of good traded. We run the regression for each of the 27 main cat egories of goods on eBay (aside from real estate and autos). The dependent variable is the log of the dollar value of the transactions between city s (seller) and city b (buyer). We use seller-and buyer-city fixed effects to control for economy size. SAME-CITY is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if buyer and seller are located in the same state and zero otherwise. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level.
VI. Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze whether online auction sites have been able to create a virtual market in which the physical distance between the buyer and seller becomes irrelevant. Using transactions data from two Internet auction platforms (eBay and MercadoLibre), we find that even though geographic distance is less of a deterrent to trade than it has been observed to be in studies of non-Internet commerce, more distant buyers are still less likely to engage in a purchase agreement than closer ones.
Furthermore, there is an abnormally large concentration of commerce among buyers and sellers within the same city limits.
As expected, the nonlinearity of the distance effect is strongest for goods that have to be used in a specific location, such as opera tickets. However, this phe nomenon is evident in all categories of items. Further analyses suggest that cultural factors and the possibility of direct contract enforcement in case of breach are the main reasons behind the distance effect. The higher the likelihood of a breach (sug gested by poor seller reputation), the less likely a transaction between distant agents will take place. Also, items of local interest, such as baseball cards, tend to be traded in local markets. Shipping costs, at least for intrastate US trade, lightly deter distant trade, but their influence cannot explain the bulk of the proximity effect. Given our focus on end-product transactions between individuals, this study is especially relevant to understanding consumer preferences about trading with distant counterparts. Our results cannot be attributed to buyer and seller location choices based on the optimization of a supply chain. In this sense, for firms designing strate gies for geographic expansion, our study stresses the importance of paying careful attention to the nonphysical dimensions of distance.
Our findings have implications for online commerce platforms that want to extend their reach. Our results suggest that they should continually innovate and perfect systems to increase the trust of market participants. Features such as con tinuous monitoring of listings, feedback systems, and buyer protection programs are of greater benefit to more distant agents who, in principle, have fewer options to ensure fair trade than closer ones. 
